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Riedel and Sass (2013) study complete information normal form
games in which ambiguity averse players use ambiguous randomiza-
tion strategies, in addition to pure and mixed strategies. The solution
concept they propose, the Ellsberg equilibrium, is a coarsening of the
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1 Introduction
The presence of ambiguity in strategic interactions has recently received in-
creasing attention. There have been attempts to allow for ambiguous acts or
beliefs in games. For complete information normal form games, two strands of
literature can be distinguished. The rst strand, which has been introduced
by Lo (1996), Marinacci (2000) and Eichberger and Kelsey (2000), consid-
ers subjective ambiguity. Ambiguity is introduced in the beliefs players hold
about the strategies adopted by their opponents. This strand extends the
belief interpretation of Nash equilibria by allowing for equilibria in ambigu-
ous beliefs. A disadvantage of these equilibria is that they leave unanswered
the question of which strategy prole is played in equilibrium. The second
strand, introduced more recently by Riedel and Sass (2013), considers ob-
jective ambiguity. The set of available strategies is expanded to ambiguous
randomization strategies { called Ellsberg strategies { which are convex sets
in the space of mixed strategies. Players may therefore render their strategy
objectively ambiguous. Riedel and Sass (2013) call such an extended game
an Ellsberg game. The solution concept proposed is the Ellsberg equilibrium:
players play a best response to the Ellsberg strategy of their opponent. As
a consequence, the Ellsberg equilibrium is a more general solution concept
than the Nash equilibrium.
In Ellsberg games, existence of Ellsberg equilibria follows from the exis-
tence of Nash equilibria. Riedel and Sass (2013) have shown that in addition
to the Nash equilibria, new Ellsberg equilibria may arise in which players use
proper Ellsberg strategies. Interestingly, in games with at least three players,
some of these new equilibria yield outcomes that cannot be reached under
Nash equilibria. In other words, their solution concept expands the support
of the outcomes. Riedel and Sass (2013) show this last point by means of an
example taken from Greenberg (2000). In the example, two small countries
decide for themselves whether to engage in a war against each other, or to
stay at peace. A superpower tries to negotiate for peace by threatening to
punish one of them in case war breaks out. Being unable to identify which
country is responsible when war breaks out, the superpower's best reply is
to punish one of the two countries picked at random with probability one
half. As a result, the only Nash equilibrium has the small countries engage
in war. If the superpower had the possibility to \remain silent" and could be
suciently ambiguous about which country it would punish, a new Ellsberg
equilibrium would appear, with peace as the unique outcome. Because the
two small countries are pessimistic in the face of ambiguity, each country
assigns a high probability to being punished in case of war, and hence do
not engage in a war. Greenberg argues that such outcome would be more
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realistic.
We provide an alternative interpretation for Ellsberg equilibria. Ellsberg
equilibria generalize mixed strategy equilibria. Mixed strategies play a cen-
tral role in game theory. Without mixing, it would for instance be impossible
to assign values to zero-sum games or to nd Nash equilibria in more general
strategic interactions.
The classic interpretation of a mixed strategy was introduced by John
von Neumann and relies on the use of an objective randomization device.
Riedel and Sass (2013) put forward a direct generalization of von Neumann's
idea to ambiguous strategies by allowing players to use Ellsberg urns with
given parameters. That is, players base their actions on the outcome of an
Ellsberg urn experiment where the probabilities are only known up to some
bounds. While such a construction makes perfect sense in theory, one might
wonder whether it would be implementable in actual games.
Even in its classic form (i.e. not allowing for ambiguity and the use of
Ellsberg urns), the objective randomization device interpretation has been
questioned and criticized. While deliberate use of a random device makes
sense in a strictly competitive game (Neumann, 1928), it might be more ques-
tionable in more cooperative situations like a coordination game (Schelling,
1980).
There exists however an interesting alternative interpretation of mixed
strategies. Harsanyi (1973) has shown that mixed strategy equilibria may be
viewed as limits of pure strategy equilibria in a slightly disturbed game where
players have private information about their payos. In this paper, we show
how one can purify, or at least disambiguate, Ellsberg equilibria in the spirit
of Harsanyi's approach. We show that Ellsberg equilibria can be viewed
as limits of equilibria in slightly disturbed games where the disturbances
are ambiguous. The Disambiguation Theorem we prove is an extension of
Harsanyi's Purication Theorem.
We conne our analysis to two-players games with two actions for each
player. We identify one class of games where one can purify the Ellsberg equi-
libria. As in Harsanyi (1973), the players use pure strategies of a threshold
type in the disturbed version of the game. From the perspective of an out-
side observer, these actions induce, in the limit, the same set of probability
distributions as the Ellsberg equilibrium.
For the games outside this class, we disambiguate the Ellsberg equilibria
in the following way. In the disturbed games, players best reply using their
two pure strategies and their maxmin strategy. The maxmin strategy plays
a key role in Ellsberg games as it allows players to hedge against Knightian
uncertainty. The appearance of such maxmin strategies is therefore natural
in our context. Again, we can show that from the perspective of an outside
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observer, the induced distributions of actions coincide in the limit with the
distributions of the Ellsberg equilibrium.
We draw the reader's attention to the limitations of the Disambiguation
Theorem we prove. It is less general than Harsanyi's theorem in two ways.
First, its scope is limited to 22 normal form games, whereas Harsanyi's
theorem is valid for all nite n-player non-cooperative games. Harsanyi's
technique cannot be adapted to the case of multiple priors we study because
it relies on smoothness of the payo functions, which is lost when one uses
a multiple prior representation for preferences. Second, in our setting, the
payos associated to a given strategy are subject to identical disturbances,
whereas disturbances are independent in Harsanyi's setting.
The paper is organized in three parts. In section 2, we introduce the de-
nitions and notation. In section 3, we present and prove our Disambiguation
Theorem. Finally, in section 4, we provide an example of disambiguation for
a particular 22 coordination game.
2 Denitions and notation
We rst present the basic 22 normal form Ellsberg game. We rst describe
the ambiguous randomization strategies available to players, how these play-
ers behave in the face of ambiguity and provide the denition of Ellsberg
equilibria. Then, we delimit the class of games considered. Finally, we de-
scribe the disturbed versions of the basic game, the strategies available to
players in these disturbed versions, and we show that these strategies are
perceived as Ellsberg strategies by external observers.
2.1 The basic game  
The games we consider are 22 normal form games, illustrated in Figure 1.
Basic notation and denitions for these games are as follows:
• Let p; q 2 [0; 1] denote the mixed strategy of player 1 and 2 respectively.
• Let the pair (p; q) 2 [0; 1] [0; 1] denote a mixed strategy prole.
• Player i's expected utility for the strategy prole (p; q) is Ui(p; q) with
Ui(p; q) = pq
1
i + p(1  q)2i + (1  p)q3i + (1  p)(1  q)4i .
• For player 1, strategy p is a best reply to q if U1(p; q)  U1(p0; q) for all
p0 2 [0; 1].
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Figure 1: Normal form of the basic 22 game  .
• Strategy prole (p; q) is a Nash equilibrium if p and q are mutual best
replies.
In Ellsberg games, in addition to pure and mixed strategies, players can
use ambiguous randomization strategies called Ellsberg strategies. For 22
games, an Ellsberg strategy is a closed interval [a; b] in the probability space
[0; 1]. If player 1 plays an Ellsberg strategy, she plays the pure strategy U with
a probability inside [a; b], but the exact point in that interval is objectively
ambiguous to player 2 and herself. It is as-if the player uses an Ellsberg urn
{ an ambiguous randomization device { to decide on the action to take.
• Player 1's set of Ellsberg strategies is E1 := f[p1; p2] j 0  p1  p2  1g
with generic element e1 := [p1; p2]. Analogously, for player 2 we have
E2 := f[q1; q2] j 0  q1  q2  1g with generic element e2 := [q1; q2].
Observe that mixed strategies belong to the set of Ellsberg strategies.
The Ellsberg strategy [p1; p2] is a proper Ellsberg strategy if the interval
is non-degenerate: p1 < p2.
• Let the pair e := (e1; e2) =
 
[p1; p2]; [q1; q2]
 2 E1  E2 denote an
Ellsberg strategy prole.
The decision making of agents confronted with ambiguous outcomes de-
pends on their attitudes with respect to ambiguity. Some empirical evidence
summarized in Camerer and Weber (1992) suggests that agents are ambi-
guity averse, i.e. agents are pessimistic in the face of multiple priors. In
decision theory, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) have shown that ambiguity
averse agents evaluate ambiguous outcomes by considering the worst point
in their set of priors. Their decision rule is therefore of the maxmin type.
More recently, Gajdos et al. (2008) have axiomatized the minimal expected
utility evaluation of ambiguous outcomes for strategic settings.
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We assume players are ambiguity averse. Given the result of Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989), players expected utility is therefore computed based on
the worst point in the interval.
• Player 1's expected utility for the strategy prole (e1; e2) is:
U1(e1; e2) = min
p2e1;q2e2
U1(p; q)
By the linearity of U1(p; q), we have:
U1
 
p; [q1; q2]

= min

U1(p; q1); U1(p; q2)

(1)
• For player 1, strategy e1 is a best reply to e2 if U1(e1; e2)  U1(e01; e2)
for all e01 2 E1.
• Strategy prole e = (e1; e2) is an Ellsberg equilibrium if e1 and e2 are
mutual best replies.
• The equilibrium e = (e1; e2) is a proper Ellsberg equilibrium if both
equilibrium strategies are proper Ellsberg strategies. It is a quasi-
proper Ellsberg equilibrium if only one equilibrium strategy is a proper
Ellsberg strategy and the other strategy is a mixed strategy.
2.2 The class of games considered
We restrict our attention to 22 normal form games satisfying two restric-
tions. First, we assume that no player has a weakly dominant strategy. As
shown by Harsanyi (1973), games with weakly dominant strategies admit
Nash equilibria that cannot be puried. Discarding weakly dominant strate-
gies rules out games that are Row Dominant for player 1 and games that are
Column Dominant for player 2.
Denition 1 (Row Dominant).
Player i's payos in   are row dominant if (1i   3i )(2i   4i )  0.
Denition 2 (Column Dominant).
Player i's payos in   are column dominant if (1i   2i )(3i   4i )  0.
The introduction of the second restriction requires some additional de-
nitions. Riedel and Sass (2013) show that two types of mixed strategies play
an important role for (quasi-) proper Ellsberg equilibria. These strategies
are central in our disambiguation result.
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Denition 3 (Indierence Strategy).
Strategy p is an indierence strategy for player 1 if:
U2(q; p
) = U2(q0; p) for all q; q0 2 [0; 1]:
Strategy q is an indierence strategy for player 2 if:
U1(p; q
) = U1(p0; q) for all p; p0 2 [0; 1]:
In words, playing your indierence strategy makes your opponent indif-
ferent between all her mixed strategies q. By denition, the pair (p; q)
constitutes a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. As shown in Lemma 1,
all games satisfying No weakly dominant strategy have a unique equilibrium
in proper mixed strategies. Therefore, indierence strategies p and q exist
and are unique. Next, we dene maxmin strategies.
Denition 4 (Maxmin Strategy).
Strategy p is a maxmin strategy for player 1 if:
p = arg max
p2[0;1]
min
q2[0;1]
U1(p; q):
Strategy q is a maxmin strategy for player 2 if:
q = arg max
q2[0;1]
min
p2[0;1]
U2(q; p):
In words, playing your maxmin strategy guarantees you the highest payo
if your opponent aims at minimizing your payo and anticipates your strategy
correctly. As shown by von Neumann and Morgenstern, maxmin strategies
exist in 22 games { they are unique for the games we consider { and the
maxmin stategy coincides with the indierence strategy in zero-sum games.
The maxmin strategy is a proper mixed strategy for the subset of games
characterized in statements 2 and 3 of Lemma 1. For these games, a player
using her maxmin strategy is \immunized" against her opponent's strategy.
This implies that her maxmin strategy makes her indierent between all her
opponent's strategies. Such a strategy therefore yields a safe expected payo.
Lemma 1.
Any game   with no weakly dominant strategies has the following properties.
1. Indierence strategies p and q are unique, maxmin strategies p and q
are unique and p; q 2 (0; 1).
2. If player 1's payos are not Column Dominant in game  , then p 2
(0; 1) and U1(p; q) = U1(p; q
0) for all q; q0 2 [0; 1].
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3. If player 2's payos are not Row Dominant in game  , then q 2 (0; 1)
and U2(q; p) = U2(q; p
0) for all p; p0 2 [0; 1].
Proof. See Appendix A.1. 
Riedel and Sass (2013) show that for games in which indierence and
maxmin strategies coincide, a particular type of Ellsberg equilibria arises for
which the indierence strategy belongs to the interior of the Ellsberg strategy.
This type of Ellsberg equilibria can not be disambiguated. This should not
be seen as a problem however because these equilibria are non-robust.1 Our
second restriction rules out these games.2
Denition 5 (Class of games  ).
A 22 normal form game   belongs to the class   if no player has a weakly
dominant strategy and for each player, the indierence and maxmin strategies
do not coincide.
As we show in Lemma 2, for all (quasi-) proper Ellsberg equilibria of
games in   and for each player, the indierence strategy lies at an extreme
point of the equilibrium Ellsberg strategy.
Lemma 2.
For all   2  , if  [p1; p2]; [q1; q2] is a (quasi-) proper Ellsberg equilibrium,
then p 2 fp1; p2g and q 2 fq1; q2g.
Proof. See Appendix A.2. 
The interpretation of our Disambiguation Theorem is dierent depending
on the class to which the game belongs. We divide our family of games into
two classes I and II, which are illustrated in Figure 2.
Denition 6 (Row and column dominance).
Consider any   2  . If player 1's payos are Column Dominant and player
2's payos are Row Dominant, then   belongs to class I, otherwise   belongs
to class II.
1Slight perturbations to the payos destroy these equilibria.
2In terms of payos, p 6= p is equivalent to 42 32
42 32+12 22 6=
41 31
41 31+11 21 and q
 6= q
is equivalent to
41 21
41 21+11 31 6=
42 22
42 22+12 32 .
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2.3 The disturbed games  ()
For any basic game   2  , we dene a parametric family of disturbed games
whose generic member  () is shown in Figure 3. Payos in  () are aected
by the realization of ambiguous disturbances. The size of the disturbances is
parameterized by   0. When  is zero, the disturbed game is equivalent to
the basic game. The ambiguous random variables r and t are private infor-
mation of player 1 and 2 respectively. Their common support is [ 1; 1]. We
emphasize that the disturbances in Harsanyi (1973) are payo-specic, which
is not the case in our framework. For simplicity, we require the disturbance
to be strategy-specic: the payos of outcomes associated to the same pure
strategy are subject to identical disturbances. As disturbances are strategy-
specic, they enter the evaluation of strategy proles as an additional term
independent of the opponent's strategy:
U1
 
p; [q1; q2]; r

= U1
 
p; [q1; q2]

+ pr; (2)
U2
 
q; [p1; p2]; t

= U2
 
q; [p1; p2]

+ qt: (3)
Observe that when maxmin strategies yield a safe payo in the basic game,
they keep this property in the disturbed games:
U1
 
p; [q1; q2]; r

= U1
 
p; [q01; q
0
2]; r

for all [q1; q2]; [q
0
1; q
0
2] 2 E2;
U2
 
q; [p1; p2]; t

= U2
 
q; [p01; p
0
2]; t

for all [p1; p2]; [p
0
1; p
0
2] 2 E1:
Unlike in Harsanyi (1973), the density fr of the random variable r over her
support [ 1; 1] is unknown. Players only have partial information about the
density fr. They only know the domain Pr of fr. The domain Pr summarizes
all of the information available to players about the density fr. We dene Pr
to be a ball in the set of densities around a known basic density f br . The basic
density f br belongs to the set F of measurable densities with full support on
[ 1; 1].
Pr :=
n
f 2 F??f br (x)(1  kr)  f(x)  f br (x)(1 + kr) for all x 2 [ 1; 1]o:
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Figure 3: The normal form of the disturbed game  () associated with the
basic game  . The realization of the disturbances r and t are the private
information of player 1 and 2, respectively.
The parameter kr 2 [0; 1] can be interpreted as the radius of the ball since
kr denes the maximal deviation from the basic density. It measures the
level of ambiguity associated with the domain Pr. When kr = 0, density fr
is known { fr = f
b
r { and there is no ambiguity. The ambiguity is maximal
for kr = 1. At this value, not all elements f 2 Pr have full support. This
way of dening a domain from a basic density is a form of -contamination,
as dened in the literature on ambiguous variables (see Huber, P. (1981),
Eichberger and Kelsey (2000) or Maccheroni et al. (2006)). Analogously, the
random variable t has unknown density ft 2 Pt and Pt is characterized by
the basic density f bt and the ambiguity parameter kt 2 [0; 1].
Strategies in the disturbed game  () are functions from the space of
possible realizations of the disturbances to the set of mixed strategies.
• Let pb : [ 1; 1] ! [0; 1] be a generic strategy for player 1 in the dis-
turbed game. For player 1, the set of strategies in the disturbed game is
denoted by S1 and contains only measurable functions p
b. Analogously,
a generic strategy for player 2 in the disturbed game is qb 2 S2.
How do players perceive the strategy of their opponent in the disturbed
game? Suppose player 2 anticipates correctly the strategy pb of player 1.
Player 2 ignores the realization of r but knows the domain Pr in which fr lies.
For each density f 2 Pr of the random variable r, strategy pb implies that
pure strategy U is played with a probability p. The probability of playing U is
minimal for the density in Pr that puts maximal weight on the realization of r
for which strategy pb prescribes low values of p. Let this minimal probability
be denoted by pmin. Conversely, a maximal probability pmax is implied by
the density in Pr that puts maximal weight on the realization of r for which
strategy pb prescribes high values of p. As Lemma 3 shows, all probabilities
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p 2 [pmin; pmax] result from some density in Pr. Therefore, when player 2
believes that player 1 plays pb, player 2 anticipates that the probability that
player 1 uses strategy U lies in some interval of probabilities [pmin; pmax]. In
other words, player 2 perceives player 1's strategy as the Ellsberg strategy
[pmin; pmax]. In our terminology, this Ellsberg strategy is induced by the
strategy pb. Observe that if kr = 0, then pmin = pmax and the induced
strategy is a mixed strategy.
Lemma 3.
Any strategy pb 2 S1 induces an Ellsberg strategy

pmin; pmax
  [0; 1] dened
by:
pmin = min
f2Pr
Z 1
 1
pb(r)f(r)dr and pmax = max
f2Pr
Z 1
 1
pb(r)f(r)dr: (4)
Proof. See Appendix A.3. 
Equivalently, any strategy qb 2 S2 induces an Ellsberg strategy

qmin; qmax

.
A direct consequence of Lemma 3 and equations (2) and (3) is the following:
for player 2, the expected utility of playing q when player 1 uses the strategy
pb inducing

pmin; pmax

is given by:
U2(q; p
b; t) = U2
 
q; [pmin; pmax]

+ qt: (5)
The equivalent equation for player 1 is:
U1(p; q
b; r) = U1
 
p; [qmin; qmax]

+ pr: (6)
For brevity, we often refer to strategies pb and qb by the Ellsberg strategies
they induce, respectively

pmin; pmax

and

qmin; qmax

.
We now dene best replies and equilibria in the disturbed games.
• Strategy pb is a best reply to strategy qb inducing

qmin; qmax

if we
have U1(p
b; [qmin; qmax

; r)  U1(pb0 ; [qmin; qmax

; r) for all r 2 [ 1; 1]
and all pb
0 2 S1.
• The prole (pb; qb) is an equilibrium in the disturbed game  () if pb
and qb are mutual best-replies. The corresponding induced Ellsberg
equilibrium is written e() =
 
[pmin; pmax]; [qmin; qmax]

.
Two categories of strategies in disturbed games are focal best replies,
namely pure and maxmin strategies. These strategies are monotone in the
realization of the ambiguous variable and are based on threshold values for
r and t.
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Denition 7 (Pure and maxmin strategies in a disturbed game).
The strategy pbpu is a pure strategy in S
1
pu  S1 if there exists a single
threshold r 2 R such that:
pbpu(r) =

0 if r  r;
1 if r > r:
The strategy pbmm is a maxmin strategy in S
1
mm  S1 if there exist two
thresholds r1; r2 2 R such that:
pbmm(r) =
8<:
0 if r < r1;
p if r1  r  r2;
1 if r > r2:
In a disturbed game, pure strategies are a special case of maxmin strate-
gies. If the maxmin strategy p is a pure strategy of the basic game, then a
maxmin strategy in the disturbed game is pure. Pure and maxmin strategies
in the disturbed game for player 2 are dened accordingly. For brevity, we
refer to maxmin strategies pbmm or q
b
mm by their two thresholds (r1; r2) or
(t1; t2).
3 The Disambiguation Theorem
This section presents and proves a disambiguation theorem for 22 normal
form games in  . This theorem is the central result of this paper. The
interpretation that our result gives to Ellsberg equilibria is contained in the
denition of puriable and disambiguable equilibria.
Denition 8 (Puriable and disambiguable equilibria).
Let e =
 
[p1; p2]; [q1; q2]

be an Ellsberg equilibrium in   2  .
• Equilibrium e is puriable if for some pair (kr; kt) 2 [0; 1]  [0; 1],
there exists a sequence of pure strategy equilibria in  () inducing
outcomes e() with
lim
!0
e() = e:
• Equilibrium e is disambiguable if for some pair (kr; kt) 2 [0; 1][0; 1],
there exists a sequence of maxmin strategy equilibria in  () inducing
outcomes e() with
lim
!0
e() = e:
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Notice that puriable equilibria are a subset of disambiguable equilibria
as pure strategies in the disturbed games are a subset of maxmin strategies.
Theorem 1 (Disambiguation of Ellsberg equilibria).
All (quasi-) proper Ellsberg equilibria in games of class I are puriable.
All (quasi-) proper Ellsberg equilibria in games of class II are disambiguable.
In the remainder of this section, we present a proof of Theorem 1. The
proof often requires considering dierent cases. For clarity, we focus on the
following subset of games.
Denition 9 (Subset  II D of games of class II).
Let  II D    be the subset of games for which player 1's payos are not
Column Dominant and player 2's payos are not Row Dominant.
For these games, maxmin strategies p and q are proper mixed strategies.
We focus on these games because they are the most dicult case and best
illustrate the consequences of ambiguity. At the end of this section, we discuss
the small adaptations needed to extend the proof to other types of games in
 .
The proof is structured as follows. First, we provide sucient conditions
for a strategy prole to be an equilibrium in a disturbed game. Second,
we show how these sucient conditions simplify for small disturbances. For
small disturbances, there is a unique threshold per best reply that lies in
the support [ 1; 1]. Third, we prove the existence of equilibria in disturbed
games for small disturbances. Then, abstracting from equilibrium condi-
tions, we show that, for small disturbances, any Ellsberg strategy potentially
involved in an Ellsberg equilibrium of the basic game can be induced by
a unique value of the ambiguity parameter. Finally, we bring all of these
ndings together to prove the theorem.
3.1 Sucient conditions for an equilibrium in  ()
In Harsanyi's Purication Theorem, best replies to the realization of the
disturbances turn out to be in pure strategies. This needs not be the case
in our setting for which the induced strategies are Ellsberg strategies. For
games in  II D, on top of their pure strategies, players best reply using their
maxmin strategies p and q. Best replies of player 1 are monotone in r and
make use of her pure strategies and her maxmin strategy. For all games
for which player 1's payos are not Column Dominant, Lemma 4 provides
conditions under which a maxmin strategy is a best reply to a strategy of
player 2 inducing [qmin; qmax].
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Lemma 4 (Best-Reply in maxmin strategies).
For all  > 0 and all   2   such that player 1's payos are not Column
Dominant, strategy pb is a best reply to any [qmin; qmax]  [0; 1] if it is a
maxmin strategy pb = (r1; r2) 2 S1mm dened by:
r0 =U1(0; qmin)  U1(1; qmin);
r00 =U1(0; qmax)  U1(1; qmax);
r1 = min(r
0; r00);
r2 = max(r
0; r00):
Proof. Take any  > 0, any   2   such that player 1's payos are not Column
Dominant and any [qmin; qmax]  [0; 1]. Given equations (1) and (2), we have
U1
 
p; [qmin; qmax]; r

= min
 
U1(p; qmin; r); U1(p; qmax; r)

= min
 
U1(p; qmin) + pr; U1(p; qmax) + pr

where U1(p; q; r) is linear in p since U1(p; q) is linear in p. Let q
1 := qmin and
q2 := qmax if r1 = r
0 and q1 := qmax and q2 := qmin otherwise. By denition
of r1 and r2 we have
U1(0; q
1) + 0r1 = U1(1; q
1) + 1r1 and U1(0; q
2) + 0r2 = U1(1; q
2) + 1r2:
Remembering that r1  r2, these denitions imply
• U1(1; q1) + 1r < U1(0; q1) + 0r for all r < r1,
• U1(1; q2) + 1r < U1(0; q2) + 0r for all r < r1.
The last two inequalities imply that for all r < r1, both U1(p; q
1; r) and
U1(p; q
2; r) are strictly decreasing in p because they both are linear in p.
Therefore the unique best reply when r < r1 is to take p = 0. The same
denitions also imply that
• U1(1; q1) + 1r > U1(0; q1) + 0r for all r > r2,
• U1(1; q2) + 1r > U1(0; q2) + 0r for all r > r2.
The last two inequalities imply that for all r > r2, both U1(p; q
1; r) and
U1(p; q
2; r) are strictly increasing in p. Therefore the unique best reply
when r > r2 is to take p = 1. Finally we have
• U1(1; q1) + 1r < U1(0; q1) + 0r for all r with r1 < r < r2,
• U1(1; q2) + 1r > U1(0; q2) + 0r for all r with r1 < r < r2.
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For those intermediate values of r, U1(p; q
1; r) is strictly decreasing in p
while U1(p; q
2; r) is strictly increasing in p. By denition of p, U1(p; q
1; r)
and U1(p; q
2; r) cross in p = p. By Lemma 1, p is unique and belongs to
(0; 1) since player 1's payos are not Column Dominant. The unique best
reply is to take p = p. Finally, when r = r1 or r = r2, either U1(p; qmin; r)
or U1(p; qmax; r) is constant in p. A (non-unique) best reply is then p = p.
Notice that this proof also covers the case qmin = qmax. 
For all games for which player 2's payos are not Row Dominant, parallel
conditions guarantee that a maxmin strategy of player 2 is a best reply to a
strategy of player 1 inducing [pmin; pmax].
Thresholds r1 and r2 dened above belong to R. The exact values taken by
those thresholds matter for pbmm only as long as they belong to the support
[ 1; 1]. For example, (r1; r2) = (0; 2) induces the same reactions to the
disturbances realization as (r01; r
0
2) = (0; 4), since 2 and 4 do not belong to
the support.
Lemma 5 provides sucient conditions for the strategy prole
 
(r1; r2); (t1; t2)

to be an equilibrium in the disturbed game.
Lemma 5 (Sucient conditions for equilibrium in  ()).
For all  > 0,   2  II D and (kr; kt) 2 [0; 1]  [0; 1], the prole of maxmin
strategies
 
(r1; r2); (t1; t2)
 2 S1mm  S2mm is an equilibrium in  () if equa-
tions (7) to (14) hold:3
r0 = U1(0; qmin)  U1(1; qmin); r00 = U1(0; qmax)  U1(1; qmax); (7)
t0 = U2(0; pmin)  U2(1; pmin); t00 = U2(0; pmax)  U2(1; pmax); (8)
r1 = min(r
0; r00); r2 = max(r0; r00); (9)
t1 = min(t
0; t00); t2 = max(t0; t00); (10)
3Equations (11) to (14) correspond to the case for which all thresholds belong to the
support. If it was not the case, the expression for these integrals should be modied. Any
threshold outside the support must be replaced by the nearest point in the support. These
modications are necessary for equations (11) to (14) to correspond to equation (4).
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pmin = min
f2Pr
Z r1
 1
0f(r)dr +
Z r2
r1
pf(r)dr +
Z 1
r2
1f(r)dr; (11)
pmax = max
f2Pr
Z r1
 1
0f(r)dr +
Z r2
r1
pf(r)dr +
Z 1
r2
1f(r)dr; (12)
qmin = min
f2Pt
Z t1
 1
0f(t)dt+
Z t2
t1
qf(t)dt+
Z 1
t2
1f(t)dt; (13)
qmax = max
f2Pt
Z t1
 1
0f(t)dt+
Z t2
t1
qf(t)dt+
Z 1
t2
1f(t)dt: (14)
Proof. Take any  > 0, any   2  II D, any (kr; kt) 2 [0; 1]  [0; 1] and
any prole of maxmin strategies
 
(r1; r2); (t1; t2)
 2 S1mm  S2mm for which
equations (7) to (14) hold. From Lemma 3, the extreme points of the induced
Ellsberg strategies [pmin; pmax] and [qmin; qmax] of any prole
 
(r1; r2); (t1; t2)

are given by equations (11) to (14). As   2  II D, we have that player 1's
payos are not Column Dominant. From Lemma 4, the best-reply of player
1 to [qmin; qmax] is to use a strategy (r1; r2) whose thresholds r1 and r2 are
dened by equations (7) and (9). Accordingly, the best-reply for player 2
to [pmin; pmax] is a maxmin strategy (t1; t2), whose thresholds t1 and t2 are
dened by equations (8) and (10). Therefore, if all equations hold, strategies
(r1; r2) and (t1; t2) are mutual best replies and the prole constitutes an
equilibrium in  (). 
3.2 Simplied conditions for small disturbances
In this subsection we show how the previous conditions simplify when the
size of disturances  is suciently small. These simpler conditions are given
in Lemma 9. Intermediary lemmas and denitions are necessary for proving
Lemma 9. Lemmas 6 to 8 study the conditions on induced Ellsberg strategies
under which the thresholds generated by the strategies lie in the support. The
lemmas also identify some properties of the induced Ellsberg strategies when
the thresholds lie in the support. First, Lemma 6 describes the interval of
probabilities in which the extreme points of the induced Ellsberg strategy
must lie in order for their associated threshold to be in the support. New
notations are necessary for establishing this lemma:
• The equilibrium conditions given in Lemma 5 link thresholds t1 and
t2 of player 2's strategy to the two extreme points of player 1's in-
duced Ellsberg strategy [pmin; pmax]. Hence there exists an interval
p (); p+()
  R, inside which pmin and pmax must lie in order for
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their associated thresholds t1 and t2 to be in [ 1; 1].4
p () := min

p 2 R
??? 1

 
U2(0; p)  U2(1; p)
 2 [ 1; 1] ;
p+() := max

p 2 R
??? 1

 
U2(0; p)  U2(1; p)
 2 [ 1; 1] :
Similarly, we dene for player 2 the interval

q (); q+()

.
q () := min

q 2 R
??? 1

 
U1(0; q)  U1(1; q)
 2 [ 1; 1] ;
q+() := max

q 2 R
??? 1

 
U1(0; q)  U1(1; q)
 2 [ 1; 1] :
Lemma 6 shows that for all , the indierence strategy p lies in the inter-
val
 
p (); p+()

and q lies in
 
q (); q+()

. Furthermore, those intervals
collapse on p and q when ! 0.
Lemma 6.
For all  > 0 and   2   we have p () < p < p+() and q () < q < q+().
Furthermore:
lim
!0
p () = lim
!0
p+() = p and lim
!0
q () = lim
!0
q+() = q:
Proof. Take any  > 0 and any   2  . We focus on proving this for the
interval
 
p (); p+()

, the reasoning is identical for
 
q+(); q ()

. The ex-
pression
1

 
U2(0; p)  U2(1; p)

returning the thresholds on t is linear in p. As   2  , player 2 does not have a
weakly dominant strategy and therefore this expression is strictly monotone
in p. Therefore p () and p+() are nite and hence exist. By denition of
p, this expression equal 0 for p = p. Therefore we have p () < p < p+()
by the strict monotonicity of the above linear expression.
The dierence U2(0; p)   U2(1; p) is independent of . As a result, for
any p 6= p the smaller , the larger ??1

 
U2(0; p)   U2(1; p)
??. Hence, for
any p 6= p, there exists an p such that for all  < p, we have 1

 
U2(0; p)  
U2(1; p)

=2 [ 1; 1]. Therefore, the smaller , the closer p () and p+() are
to p. In the limit, the interval [p (); p+()] collapse on p. 
4As shown in the proof of Lemma 6, the extreme points of the interval

p (); p+()

exist.
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Lemmas 7 and 8 provide bounds around the extreme points of the in-
duced Ellsberg strategies when thresholds lie in the interior of the support
and ambiguity is strictly positive. If the domain Pr contains a strictly posi-
tive amount of ambiguity, Lemma 7 shows that the induced Ellsberg strategy
cannot degenerate into a mixed strategy when a threshold lies in the interior
of the support. If one extreme point of the induced Ellsberg strategy for
player 1 equals p, the other extreme point lies outside a non-degenerate in-
terval (pl; pu) around p. New notations are necessary for establishing Lemma
7.
• As shown in Lemma 4, player 1 best replies to any realization of r
by playing a strategy in f0; p; 1g. Equivalently, player 2's best reply
to t lies in f0; q; 1g. For small disturbances, at most two of the three
strategies in those sets are used in equilibrium. In the absence of ambi-
guity, only pure strategies are used. In the presence of ambiguity, the
payo structure determines for each player which two strategies among
these three strategies are used in equilibrium. These two strategies are
referred to as A and B for player 1 and C and D for player 2. Let
A;B 2 f0; p; 1g with A < B and C;D 2 f0; q; 1g with C < D be such
that:
A := 0 and B := 1 if kt = 0;
A := 0 and B := p if kt > 0 and p
 2 (0; p);
A := p and B := 1 if kt > 0 and p
 2 (p; 1);
C := 0 and D := 1 if kr = 0;
C := 0 and D := q if kr > 0 and q
 2 (0; q);
C := q and D := 1 if kr > 0 and q
 2 (q; 1):
The maxmin strategy of one player is never used when the ambiguity
about her opponent's payos is zero. For example, if kr = 0 then the
induced Ellsberg strategy of player 1 is a mixed strategy and player 2
best replies using pure strategies.
• Let function pmin : R2 ! [0; 1] : (r1; r2) ! pmin(r1; r2) be dened by
equation (11). Accordingly, functions pmax, qmin and qmax are dened
by equations (12), (13) and (14) respectively.
Lemma 7.
For all   2  II D, kr 2 (0; 1] and p 2 (A;B), there exist unique pl and
pu 2 [0; 1] with pl < p < pu such that
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• for all (r1; r2) 2 S1mm with pmax(r1; r2) = p we have pmin(r1; r2)  pl;
and at least for one such (r1; r2) we have pmin(r1; r2) = p
l,
• for all (r1; r2) 2 S1mm with pmin(r1; r2) = p, pmax(r1; r2)  pu,
and at least for one such (r1; r2) we have pmax(r1; r2) = p
u,
Accordingly, for all kt 2 (0; 1] and q 2 (C;D), there exist ql; qu 2 [0; 1] with
equivalent properties.
Proof. Take any   2  II D, any kr 2 (0; 1] and any p 2 (A;B). We focus on
proving the existence of such pl and pu. The proof for ql and qu follows the
same reasoning. We dene the following sets:
Smax(p) :=

(r1; r2) 2 S1mm
??pmax(r1; r2) = p and r1; r2 2 [ 1; 1]	;
Smin(p) :=

(r1; r2) 2 S1mm
??pmin(r1; r2) = p and r1; r2 2 [ 1; 1]	:
Smax(p) is a subset of the maxmin strategies whose induced Ellsberg strate-
gies have p as their maximal point. We show below this set is non-empty.
The restriction r1; r2 2 [ 1; 1] implies that Smax(p) and Smin(p) are closed
sets.
We dene pl from the set Smax(p):
pl := max
(r1;r2)2Smax(p)
pmin(r1; r2):
As the domain of images of function pmin is [0; 1] and the set S
max(p) is non-
empty and closed, pl is well dened. The denitions of pl and Smax(p) imply
that pl is such that:
(i) for all (r1; r2) 2 Smax(p) we have pmax(r1; r2) = p and pmin(r1; r2)  pl;
and at least for one such (r1; r2) we have pmin(r1; r2) = p
l, and
(ii) there is no p0 6= pl with the previous properties.
We next show that pl < p. As   2  II D we have p 2 (A;B), and hence two
cases can arise:
• Case 1: p > p. This case is such that A = p and B = 1 and by
assumption we have p 2 (p; 1). Let rL2 and rH2 be implicitly dened by
pmax( 1; rH2 ) = p and pmax(rL2 ; rL2 ) = p:
We show that for all (r1; r2) 2 Smax(p), we have  1 < rL2  r2  rH2 <
1. Observe this implies that Smax(p) is a non-empty set.
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{ First we show  1 < rL2 < 1.
For all kr 2 (0; 1], because of its integral functional form, the
expression of pmax(x; x) is continuous in x. Furthermore, it is
decreasing in x for x 2 [ 1; 1) as maxmin strategies are increasing
in r. Since pmax( 1; 1) = 1, pmax(1; 1) = 0 and by assumption
p 2 (p; 1), we therefore have  1 < rL2 < 1.
{ Second we show  1 < rH2 < 1.
For all kr 2 (0; 1], the expression of pmax( 1; x) is continuous in
x and decreasing in x for x 2 [ 1; 1). Since pmax( 1; 1) = 1,
pmax( 1; 1) = p and by assumption p 2 (p; 1), we therefore have
 1 < rH2 < 1.
{ Then we show that rL2 < r
H
2 .
Assume instead that rL2  rH2 . As by denition pmax( 1; rH2 ) =
p, we have pmax(r
H
2 ; r
H
2 ) < p as for all kr 2 (0; 1] and r1; r2 2
[ 1; 1), pmax is a strictly decreasing function of both r1 and r2
and we showed  1 < rH2 . As rL2  rH2 the same reasoning implies
pmax(r
L
2 ; r
L
2 )  pmax(rH2 ; rH2 ) < p, contradiction the denition of
rL2 .
{ Finally we show that for all (r1; r2) 2 Smax(p) we have rL2  r2 
rH2 .
We focus on showing r2  rH2 , the proof that rL2  r2 follows
similar lines. Assume instead for some (r1; r2) 2 Smax(p) that
r2 > r
H
2 . By the denition of S
max(p) we have  1  r1. As pmax is
strictly decreasing in its argument, this implies that pmax(r1; r2) 
pmax( 1; r2). As we assumed r2 > rH2 , the same reasoning implies
pmax( 1; r2) < pmax( 1; rH2 ) = p. Together we have pmax(r1; r2) <
p, implying that (r1; r2) =2 Smax(p), a contradiction.
• Case 2: p < p. This second case is such that A = 0 and B = p and
by assumption we have p 2 (0; p). Let rL1 and rH1 be implicitly dened
by pmax(r
H
1 ; 1) = p and pmax(r
L
1 ; r
L
1 ) = p. The proof showing that for
all (r1; r2) 2 Smax(p), we have  1 < rL1  r1  rH1 < 1 is omitted as it
follows the lines of that given for case 1.
Together, either there exist rL1 and r
H
1 such that for all (r1; r2) 2 Smax(p)
we have  1 < rL1  r1  rH1 < 1 or there exist rL2 and rH2 such that for
all (r1; r2) 2 Smax(p) we have  1 < rL2  r2  rH2 < 1. This implies
min(j r1 j; j r2 j) < 1.
From there, as kr > 0 we have for all (r1; r2) 2 Smax(p) that
pmin(r1; r2) < pmax(r1; r2)
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because
(i) pmin(r1; r2) = pmax(r1; r2) when kr = 0 and,
(ii) for all (r1; r2) with min(j r1 j; j r2 j) < 1, pmax is a strictly increasing
function of kr at all kr 2 [0; 1) while pmin is a strictly decreasing function
of kr.
This proves that pl < p.
There remains to show that pl has the same properties for all (r1; r2) 2
S1mm. As the support of r is [ 1; 1], for any (r1; r2) 2 S1mm with pmax(r1; r2) =
p such that (r1; r2) =2 Smax(p), there exists (r01; r02) 2 Smax(p) inducing the
same Ellsberg strategy as (r1; r2). Therefore p
l has the desired properties.
We dene then pu from the set Smin(p):
pu := min
(r1;r2)2Smin(p)
pmax(r1; r2):
An analog reasoning proves that pu has the desired properties. 
Lemma 8 shows that the interval (pl; pu) around p dened in the previous
lemma evolves monotonically with p.
Lemma 8.
Take any   2  II D.
• For all kr 2 (0; 1), p 2 (A;B) and p0 2 (pl; p) we have
p0l < pl < p0 < p < p0u < pu:
• For all kt 2 (0; 1), q 2 (C;D) and q0 2 (ql; q) we have
q0l < ql < q0 < q < q0u < qu:
Proof. We focus on proving the rst claim. The proof is based on the prop-
erties of functions pmin and pmax. Those functions are continuous in both
their arguments r1 and r2. Furthermore, they are non-increasing in both ar-
guments and strictly decreasing as soon as these arguments belong to [ 1; 1).
Take any   2  II D, any kr 2 (0; 1), any p 2 (A;B) and any p0 2 (pl; p).
From Lemma 7, we have that p0l < pl < p0u. We show by contradiction that
p0u < pu, p < p0u and p0l < pl.
Assume rst pu  p0u. This implies by denition of p0u that there does not
exist (r1; r2) with pmin(r1; r2) = p
0 and pmax(r1; r2) < pu. Take (r01; r
0
2) with
pmin(r
0
1; r
0
2) = p and pmax(r
0
1; r
0
2) = p
u. By denition of pu, this (r01; r
0
2) exists
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q = q1 q = q2
p = p1 type 1 type 2
p = p2 type 3 type 4
Table 1: Four types of (quasi)-proper Ellsberg equilibria
 
[p1; p2]; [q1; q2]

in
function of the extreme point occupied by the indierence strategy of each
player. For quasi-proper Ellsberg equilibria, the extreme points of one player
are equal and those equilibria belong to two of the above-dened types. The
mixed strategy equilibrium (p; q) belongs to all four.
and has at least one threshold in the interior of the support. By continuity
and non-increasingness of pmin, there exists (r1; r2) with r1 > r
0
1 and r2 > r
0
2
such that pmin(r1; r2) = p
0. Since p 2 (A;B), we have either r01 2 ( 1; 1) or
r02 2 ( 1; 1).5 By the properties of pmax, we have pmax(r1; r2) < pmax(r01; r02) =
pu, a contradiction.
Assume then that p0u  p. This implies by denition of p0u that there
exists (r1; r2) with pmin(r1; r2) = p
0 and pmax(r1; r2)  p. By continuity and
non-increasingness of pmax, there exists (r
0
1; r
0
2) with r
0
1  r1 and r02  r2
such that pmax(r
0
1; r
0
2) = p. By the properties of pmin, we have pmin(r
0
1; r
0
2) 
pmin(r1; r2) = p
0, a contradiction to the denition of pl since pl < p0.
Assume nally that pl  p0l. This implies by denition of p0l that there
exists (r1; r2) with pmax(r1; r2) = p
0 and pmin(r1; r2)  pl. By continuity and
non-increasingness of pmax, there exists (r
0
1; r
0
2) with r
0
1 < r1 and r
0
2 < r2
such that pmax(r
0
1; r
0
2) = p. By the properties of pmin, we have pmin(r
0
1; r
0
2) >
pmin(r1; r2)  pl, which contradicts the denition of pl. 
When only one of the two thresholds lies in the interior of the support,
we denote this threshold r for player 1 and t for player 2. The equilibrium
conditions simplify. Nevertheless, their expressions will depend on the type
of equilibrium we consider. Lemma 2 shows that for both players the indier-
ence strategy is an extreme point of Ellsberg strategies in any (quasi)-proper
Ellsberg equilibrium. The expression of the conditions depends on whether
this extreme point is the maximum or the minimum. The four dierent types
of (quasi-) proper Ellsberg equilibria are presented in Table 1.
Riedel and Sass (2013) present results linking the payo structure with
the extreme points occupied by the indierence strategy of each player. As
all proper Ellsberg equilibria of a game belong to the same type, these types
naturally dene subsets of games. We denote  D 4   II D the subset of
games in  II D having proper Ellsberg equilibria of type 4. For the rest
5See proof of Lemma 7.
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of the proof, we concentrate exclusively on equilibria of type 4, which are
illustrated in the example developed in section 4. The proof presented is
easily adapted for the other types.
In Lemma 9, we give simplied sucient conditions for a prole of maxmin
strategies to constitute an equilibrium in slightly disturbed games.
Lemma 9 (Simplied equilibrium conditions in slightly disturbed games).
For all   2  D 4 and (kr; kt) 2 [0; 1]  [0; 1], there exists  > 0 such that
for all  < , if the prole of maxmin strategies
 
(r1; r2); (t1; t2)

satises
conditions (15) to (18) and equations (19) to (22), then it is an equilibrium
in  ().
if p < p : r := min(r1; r2) 2 [ 1; 1] and if r1 < r2 : max(r1; r2)  1;
(15)
if p > p : r := max(r1; r2) 2 [ 1; 1] and if r1 < r2 : min(r1; r2)   1;
(16)
if q < q : t := min(t1; t2) 2 [ 1; 1] and if t1 < t2 : max(t1; t2)  1;
(17)
if q > q : t := max(t1; t2) 2 [ 1; 1] and if t1 < t2 : min(t1; t2)   1;
(18)
r = U1(0; qmax)  U1(1; qmax); (19)
t = U2(0; pmax)  U2(1; pmax); (20)
pmax = max
f2Pr
Z r
 1
Af(r)dr +
Z 1
r
Bf(r)dr; (21)
qmax = max
f2Pt
Z t
 1
Cf(t)dt+
Z 1
t
Df(t)dt: (22)
Proof. We show that such maxmin strategies (r1; r2) and (t1; t2) are mutual
best replies. Take any   2  D 4. Lemma 5 gives sucient conditions for
such prole to be an equilibrium. In these conditions, the following additional
four equations complement equations (19) to (22):
r0 = U1(0; qmin)  U1(1; qmin);
t0 = U2(0; pmin)  U2(1; pmin);
pmin = min
f2Pr
Z r
 1
Af(r)dr +
Z 1
r
Bf(r)dr;
qmin = min
f2Pt
Z t
 1
Cf(t)dt+
Z 1
t
Df(t)dt:
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We show there exists  > 0 such that for all  < , if
 
(r1; r2); (t1; t2)

sat-
isfy conditions (15) to (18), then r0 =2 [ 1; 1] and t0 =2 [ 1; 1] and hence those
four additional equations are irrelevant for the prole to be an equilibrium.
By denition of A and B we have p 2 (A;B). By Lemma 6, there exists
1 > 0 such that for all  < 1 we have

p (); p+()
  (A;B). Accordingly,
we have q 2 (C;D) and there exists 2 > 0 such that for all  < 2 we have
q (); q+()
  (C;D). As  (r1; r2); (t1; t2) satises conditions (15) to (18)
we have r 2 [ 1; 1] and t 2 [ 1; 1] and hence two cases must be considered.
Case 1: jrj = 1 or jtj = 1.
Taking  = min(1; 2) we derive a contradiction for this case. Assume
that jtj = 1. Conditions (17) and (18) imply that min(j t1 j; j t2 j)  1. The
maxmin strategy (t1; t2) is such that q
b(t) is the same for all t 2 [ 1; 1] with
qb(t) 2 fC;Dg and therefore qmin = qmax 2 fC;Dg. As for all  <  we have
q (); q+()
  (C;D), this implies that either r =2 [ 1; 1], which violates
condition (15) or (16), or equation (19) does not hold.
Case 2: jrj < 1 or jtj < 1.
Proving that (r1; r2) and (t1; t2) are mutual best replies boils down to
showing that
(i) r0 and t0 are not in the support and,
(ii) the relative size of r and r0 makes it optimal for player 1 to react to r
using strategies A and B, as well as it is optimal for player 2 to react
to t using C and D given the relative size of t and t0.
If (i) and (ii) hold, then equations (19) to (22) are a simplication of equations
(7) to (14) and the strategies are mutual best replies. Two subcases must be
considered
• Subcase 2.1: kr > 0 and kt > 0.
The prole of maxmin strategies
 
(r1; r2); (t1; t2)

induces proper Ells-
berg strategies since thresholds r and t lie in the interior of [ 1; 1].6
Player 1's proper Ellsberg strategy has two dierent extreme points
pmax and pmin which induce two dierent thresholds t
 and t0 for player
2. Accordingly we have qmax 6= pmin and hence t 6= t0.
6This statement holds as well when kr = 1 or kt = 1 as pmax 2 (A;B) and qmax 2
(C;D), implying respectively that pmin 2 fA;Bg or qmin 2 fC;Dg.
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We show here (i), that is r0 and t0 are not in the support. Given kr > 0
and kt > 0, by Lemma 7 and Lemma 8 there exist pL, pU 2 (A;B) and
qL, qU 2 (C;D) such that
plL  plU < pL < p < pU < puL  puU ;
qlL  qlU < qL < q < qU < quL  quU :
such that if pmax 2 [pL; pU ], then pmin =2 [pL; pU ] and if qmax 2 [qL; qU ],
then qmin =2 [qL; qU ]. We prove the existence of such pL and pU . As
p 2 (A;B), given kr > 0, Lemma 7 shows there exists pl and pu
with pl < p < pu such that if pmax = p, then pmin  pl and if
pmin = p
, then pmax  pu. Take any pL 2 (pl; p). By Lemma 8, we
have p < puL. Take pU such that p
 < pU < puL. By Lemma 8 we have
plL < p
l
U < pL < p
 < pU < puL < p
u
U , hence the desired property for
[pL; pU ].
7
Let 0 > 0 be such that 0  1 and for all  < 0 we have

p (); p+()
 
(pL; pU). By Lemma 6, this 
0 exists since

p (); p+()

tends to [p; p]
as  ! 0. The same reasoning proves the existence of an 00 > 0 such
that 00  2 and for all  < 00 we have

q (); q+()
  (qL; qU). Take
 = min(0; 00).
By the construction of , for all  <  conditions (15) and (16) combined
with equation (19) imply that qmax 2

q (); q+()
  [qL; qU ] and
hence qmin =2 [qL; qU ], therefore qmin =2

q (); q+()

, implying r0 =2
[ 1; 1]. A parallel reasoning shows t0 =2 [ 1; 1].
We turn to proving (ii). We focus on showing that the relative sizes
of t and t0 make it optimal for player 2 to react to t using strategies
C and D. A parallel argument demonstrates that player 1 best replies
using A and B. As   2  D 4 we have p 2 (A;B), and hence two
subcases can arise:
{ Subcase 2.1.1: q < q.
Assume for a moment that the dierence U2(0; p)   U2(1; p) is a
strictly increasing function of p. As pmin < pmax, this assumption
implies that for a given  we have t0 < t and hence t1 = t0 and
t2 = t
. As t 2 [ 1; 1] and t0 =2 [ 1; 1], we have t1 <  1. By
denition, when q < q, we have C = q and D = 1. It is hence
optimal for player 2 to react to the realization of t using C and
D, as shown in the proof of Lemma 4.
7Weak inequalities plL  plU and puL  puU come from the case kr = 1. For such value
of kr, we have p
l
L = p
l
U = A and p
u
L = p
u
U = B, as shown in the proof of Lemma 12.
25
There remains to show that the dierence U2(0; p)  U2(1; p) is a
strictly increasing function of p. The dierence U2(0; p) U2(1; p)
is linear in p and can not be constant since weakly dominant
strategies are ruled out. By denition, any game   2  D 4 has
proper Ellsberg equilibria e =
 
[p1; p2]; [q1; q2]

of type 4, for which
p2 = p
 and hence p1 < p. In order for [q1; q2] to be a best reply
to [p1; p2], we must have q
 2 fq1; q2g as shown in Lemma 2. For
q 2 fq1; q2g, we must have
U2(q; p1) > U2(q; p
) for all q 2 (q; 1]:
In eect, remember that the denition of p implies that U2(0; p) 
U2(1; p
) = 0 and hence U2(q; p) is constant in q. The deni-
tion of q implies U2(q; p
) = U2(q; p1). If we had instead for all
q 2 (q; 1] that U2(q; p1) < U2(q; p), then U2(q; p1) is strictly de-
creasing in q and the best reply for the ambiguity averse player 2
to [p1; p
] would be some [q1; q2]  [0; q], contradicting Lemma 2
since q < q. As U2(q; p) = U2(q; p1) and U2(1; p1) > U2(1; p), we
have U2(0; p1) < U2(0; p
). Last two inequalities imply U2(0; p1) 
U2(1; p1) < U2(0; p
)   U2(1; p) and by linearity of U2(q; p) in p,
the dierence U2(0; p)   U2(1; p) is a strictly increasing function
of p as p1 < p
.
{ Subcase 2.1.2: q < q.
The argument follow the same line as for the previous case. The
major dierence is that U2(0; p)   U2(1; p) must now be strictly
decreasing function of p. As pmin < pmax, this implies that for
a given  we have t < t0 and hence t1 = t and t2 = t0. As
t 2 [ 1; 1] and t0 =2 [ 1; 1], we have t2 > 1. By denition, when
q < q, we have C = 0 and D = q. It is hence optimal for player
2 to react to the realization of t using C and D.
Statement (ii) holds as for each of the above subcases, conditions (17)
and (18) pick t among t1 and t2 consistently with the particular game
considered and ensure that t0 is outside the support with the appropri-
ate relative size with respect to t.
• Subcase 2.1: kr = 0 or kt = 0.
We consider only kr = 0, without loss of generality. This implies that
C = 0 and D = 1, pmin = pmax and t
0 = t. Both t0 and t belong to the
interior of the support. The induced Ellsberg prole is quasi-proper.
Except for these dierences, the argument given above to prove (i) and
(ii) carries on to this subcase.
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3.3 Existence of equilibria
Showing existence of equilibria in the disturbed game is much easier for small
disturbances. The simplied conditions of Lemma 9 are such that only one
threshold per strategy is constrained. The other threshold can be picked
arbitrarily provided it lies outside the support and has the appropriate sign.
Lemma 10 (Existence of equilibria in disturbed games).
For all   2  D 4 and (kr; kt) 2 [0; 1] [0; 1], there exists  > 0 such that for
all  < , equilibria exist in  ().
Proof. Using the Intermediate Value Theorem, we show the existence of a
prole of thresholds (r; t) satisfying equations (19) to (22). If it exists, then
it is easy to see that there always exists a strategy prole
 
(r1; r2); (t1; t2)

that, together with (r; t), satises conditions (15) to (18). Such strategy
prole
 
(r1; r2); (t1; t2)

satises the conditions of Lemma 9 for small . This
proves the existence of equilibria in slightly disturbed games.
There remains to show the existence of a prole of thresholds (r; t)
satisfying equations (19) to (22). Take any   2  D 4 and any (kr; kt) 2
[0; 1] [0; 1]. We dene the four functions hr, ht, hp and hq:
hr :[q
 (); q+()]! [ 1; 1] : q ! hr(q) := 1

 
U1(0; q)  U1(1; q)

;
ht :[p
 (); p+()]! [ 1; 1] : p! ht(p) := 1

 
U2(0; p)  U2(1; p)

;
hp :[ 1; 1]! [A;B] : r ! hp(r) := max
f2Pr
Z r
 1
Af(r)dr +
Z 1
r
Bf(r)dr;
hq :[ 1; 1]! [C;D] : t! hq(t) := max
f2Pt
Z t
 1
Cf(t)dt+
Z 1
t
Df(t)dt:
Those four functions are all strictly monotone and continuous. By the de-
nition of p (), p+(), q () and q+(), the domain of images of hr and ht is
[ 1; 1] and hence all four functions are surjective. The strict monotonicity of
these functions imply they are injective. Being all bijective (surjective and
injective), they admit inverse functions h 1r , h
 1
t , h
 1
p , h
 1
q which are strictly
monotone and continuous.8
8The strict monotonicity of hp and hq is only valid as long as kr < 1 and kt < 1.
When kr = 1 (kt = 1), function hp (hq) is not injective. This is not a problem for our
purpose as these functions are injective and surjective on a smaller domain. For example,
when kr = 1, function hp is bijective on [r^; 1]  [ 1; 1] dened in the proof of Lemma
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Based on these four functions, we dene two composite functions g1 and
g2:
g1 :[A;B]! [q (); q+()] : p! g1(p) := h 1r  h 1p (p) = (hp  hr) 1(p);
g2 :[C;D]! [p (); p+()] : q ! g2(q) := h 1t  h 1q (q) = (hq  ht) 1(q):
Being composite functions of strictly monotone and continuous functions, g1
and g2 inherit those properties.
By Lemma 6, there exists 0 > 0 such that for all  < 0 we have
[p (); p+()]  (A;B) and [q (); q+()]  (C;D). Those two composite
functions are then used to dene the continuous mapping  :
 : [A;B]! [p (); p+()] : p! (p) := g2  g1(p):
We have therefore that for all  < 0,  is a continuous mapping from [A;B]!
[p (); p+()]  (A;B). By the Intermediary Value Theorem, it has a xed
point p^ 2 [p (); p+()]. This xed point is associated to q^ = g1(p^) as well as
r^ = hr(q^) and t^ = ht(p^). By construction, these r^, t^, p^ and q^ satisfy equations
(19) to (22) in Lemma 9. Let 00 be taken from the statement of Lemma 9.
Taking  = min(0; 00) completes the proof. 
3.4 The limit of the sequence of equilibria
There remains to prove that, when the disturbance size vanishes, the Ells-
berg equilibrium induced in the disturbed game tends to the equilibrium
in the initial game. By Lemma 6 and Lemma 9, slightly disturbed games
admit equilibria inducing Ellsberg strategies with an extreme point close to
the indierence strategy. Furthermore, as the disturbance size vanishes, the
extreme point tends to the indierence strategy. We show in Lemma 11 that,
for each particular level of ambiguity, a unique threshold's value induces such
an extreme point. Then, given the other extreme point of the equilibrium
Ellsberg strategy in the basic game, Lemma 12 shows there exists an appro-
priate level of ambiguity for the induced Ellsberg strategy to reproduce the
equilibrium in the basic game. More precisely, abstracting from equilibrium
conditions, any Ellsberg strategy can be induced for a unique value of the
ambiguity parameter. We introduce new notations that are useful for small
12. The denition of probabilities p () and p+() must be adapted such that hr has the
appropriate domain of image [r^; 1]. On this basis a similar mapping can be constructed.
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disturbances:
pmin(r
) := min
f2Pr
Z r
 1
Af(r)dr +
Z 1
r
Bf(r)dr; (23)
pmax(r
) := max
f2Pr
Z r
 1
Af(r)dr +
Z 1
r
Bf(r)dr; (24)
qmin(t
) := min
f2Pt
Z t
 1
Cf(t)dt+
Z 1
t
Df(t)dt; (25)
qmax(t
) := max
f2Pt
Z t
 1
Cf(t)dt+
Z 1
t
Df(t)dt: (26)
Abstracting from equilibrium conditions, Lemma 11 shows that for any
given kr, there exists a unique threshold r
 for which the induced Ellsberg
strategy has the desired value for one of the two extreme points.
Lemma 11 (Uniqueness of r).
Consider any   2   and (kr; kt) 2 [0; 1] [0; 1].
• For all p 2 (A;B), there is a unique r 2 ( 1; 1) such that pmin(r) = p.
• For all p 2 (A;B), there is a unique r0 2 ( 1; 1) such that pmax(r0) =
p.
For all q 2 (C;D), equivalent t and t0 are also unique.
Proof. We prove only the existence and uniqueness of r. Function pmin
is continuous and weakly decreasing in r.9 Furthemore, pmin( 1) = B
and pmin(1) = A. By continuity, there exists hence r
 2 ( 1; 1) such that
pmin(r
) = p. We prove now uniqueness.
For all kr 2 [0; 1), all f 2 Pr have full support. Function pmin is therefore
strictly decreasing for all r 2 [ 1; 1], which entails uniqueness of r.
For the case kr = 1, let RA := fr 2 [ 1; 1]jpmin(r) = Ag and let r^ :=
minfr 2 RAg. This r^ exists since the set RA is a non-degenerate closed
interval. Uniqueness of r is ensured since p > A and for all r 2 [ 1; r^),
function pmin is strictly decreasing in r. 
Lemma 12 (All equilibrium Ellsberg strategies can be induced).
Consider any   2  .
1. For all p1 2 (A;B) and all p2 2 [p1; B], there exists a unique kr 2 [0; 1]
such that for some r 2 [ 1; 1] we have pmin(r) = p1 and pmax(r) =
p2.
9Function pmin is strictly decreasing in r
 when kr < 1.
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2. For all p2 2 (A;B) and all p1 2 [A; p2], there exists a unique k0r 2 [0; 1]
such that for some r0 2 [ 1; 1] we have pmin(r0) = p1 and pmax(r0) =
p2.
Equivalent statements hold true for player 2.
Proof. We prove only the rst of the two claims.
By Lemma 11, for all p1 2 (A;B) and all kr 2 [0; 1], there exists a unique
r 2 ( 1; 1) such that pmin(r) = p1. Let F : [0; 1] ! [ 1; 1] : kr ! F (kr)
be the function pointing, for each value of kr 2 [0; 1], to the particular r
inducing pmin(r
) = p1 and hence F (kr) = r. From equation (23), function
F is continuous and strictly decreasing in kr as p1 2 (A;B).
As F is continuous, the composite function pmax  F : [0; 1] ! [p1; b] :
kr ! pmax
 
F (kr)

is continuous and strictly increasing in kr as p1 2 (A;B).
The rst claim we need to prove follows then from the fact that pmax
 
F (0)

=
pmin
 
F (0)

= p1 and pmax
 
F (1)

= B.
The equality pmax
 
F (1)

= B follows from the denition of the domain
Pr. For kr = 1, some f 2 Pr do not have full support anymore and there
exists a unique r^ 2 ( 1; 1) such that:
max
f2Pr
Z r^
 1
f(r)dr = 1 and min
f2Pr
Z r^
 1
f(r)dr = 0:
This r^ is implicitly dened by
R r^
 1 f
b
r (r)dr =
1
2
. As a result, if pmin = p1 < 1,
then r < r^ and pmax = B. In eect, when kr = 1, for all r 2 ( 1; 1) either
pmin(r) = A or pmax(r) = B. 
We emphasize again that we did not require in Lemmas 11 and 12 that
threshold r corresponds to any kind of best reply. Moreover the previous
lemmas holds true independently of the value taken by .
3.5 Proof of the theorem
We rephrase here Theorem 1 for   2  D 4. The proof given covers a partic-
ular subset of games but similar proofs can easily be constructed to extend
the proof to the full family of games  .
Theorem 1 (Disambiguation of equilibria in   2  D 4).
For all   2  D 4 and all (quasi-) proper Ellsberg equilibrium e =  [p1; p2]; [q1; q2]
in  , there exists a unique pair (kr; kt) 2 [0; 1] [0; 1] for which there exists
a sequence of Ellsberg strategy proles fe()g induced by equilibria in  ()
with
lim
!0
e() = e:
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Proof. Take any   2  D 4. Let f (t)g1t=1 be a sequence of disturbed
games for which t := 1
t
for all t 2 N. This sequence is dened such that
limt!1  (t) =  . By Lemma 10, for all (kr; kt) 2 [0; 1] [0; 1] there exists
 > 0 such that for all  <  there exist equilibria in maxmin strategies in
the disturbed game. Let T be the smallest t 2 N such that t < . There
exists hence a sequence of equilibria fe(t)g1t=T , one for each disturbed game
in f (t)g1t=T , for which t ! 0 when t!1. From now on, this sequence is
denoted fe()g. There remains to show that for all (quasi-) proper Ellsberg
equilibrium e in  , there exists (kr; kt) 2 [0; 1] [0; 1] such that this sequence
has the right limit.
By the denition of  D 4, we have for all (quasi-) proper Ellsberg equi-
libria e =
 
[p1; p2]; [q1; q2]

that p2 = p
 and q2 = q. Riedel and Sass (2013)
have shown for such games that e is a (quasi-) proper Ellsberg equilibrium if
and only if A  p1  p and C  q1  p. Consider any p1 and q1 satisfying
those constraints.
Take any (quasi-) proper Ellsberg equilibria e =
 
[p1; p2]; [q1; q2]

for game
 . Let kr 2 [0; 1] be such that for some r 2 [ 1; 1], we have pmin(r) = p1
and pmax(r
) = p2. Let kt 2 [0; 1] be such that for some t 2 [ 1; 1], we have
qmin(t
) = q1 and qmax(t) = q2. By Lemma 12, the pair (kr; kt) 2 [0; 1][0; 1]
exists and is unique. By Lemma 11, the associated pair (r; t) is also unique.
By Lemmas 6 and 9, there exists a sequence of Ellsberg strategy pro-
les e() =
 
[pmin(); pmax()]; [qmin(); qmax()]

induced by equilibria in the
sequence of disturbed games such that
lim
!0
pmax() = p
; and
lim
!0
qmax() = q
:
By Lemma 11, this can only be the case if the sequence of thresholds f(r(); t())g
associated to the sequence of maxmin strategies equilibria by conditions (15)
to (18) is such that
lim
!0
f(r(); t())g = (r; t):
By the construction of (kr; kt), this implies
lim
!0
pmin() = p1; and
lim
!0
qmin() = q1:
This shows lim!0 e() = e and the equilibrium is disambiguable.

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Figure 4: Symmetric \Battle of the Sexes" game  3 2  D 4 for which p = 23 ,
p = 1
3
, q = 2
3
and q = 1
3
.
3.6 Adapting the proof for other games in  
The proof presented was designed for games in  D 4. It did not cover games
of class I nor some games in class II. We do not provide here a proof for those
games but discuss shortly what parts of the proof need to be adatped.
Extending the proof to games in  II D that do not belong to  D 4 is
easy. The unique adaptations relates to the extreme point occupied by the
indierence strategy in the equilibrium Ellsberg strategy. These extreme
points are given in Table 1.
Games of class I are such that their disturbed versions admit equilibria in
pure strategies. The conditions under which a pure strategy in the disturbed
game is a best reply are given in Appendix A.4. These conditions rely on a
unique threshold and only pure strategies of the basic games are used. As a
result, equilibrium conditions are simpler than expressed in Lemma 5. The
only diculty is to select the appropriate threshold among the two thresholds
implied by the induced Ellsberg strategies. The selection procedure is given
in Lemma 13 (see Appendix A.4). There is no need to search for simpler
conditions for small disturbances as only one threshold denes a pure strategy
in the disturbed game. The proof of existence of equilibrium follows exactly
the same lines. The major dierence is that A and B are replaced respectively
by 0 and 1 (and so are C and D).
Games of class II that do not belong to  II D are hybrid in the sense
that the best reply of one player is a pure strategy whereas the one of the
other is a maxmin strategy. As a result, the proof for this case will borrow
elements from the proof for games of class I and games in  II D.
4 An example of disambiguation
In this section, we illustrate the disambiguation of proper Ellsberg equilib-
ria in the symmetric game  3 2  D 4 of the type \Battle of the sexes",
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illustrated in Figure 4. For this game, the expected utilities are given by:
U1(p; q) = 2p+ q(1  3p);
U2(q; p) = 2q + p(1  3q):
The indierence strategies are p = q = 2
3
and the maxmin strategies are
p = q = 1
3
, which conrms that  3 belongs to  
D 4. Riedel and Sass (2013)
have shown that for this coordination game, the set of Ellsberg equilibrium
is
n 
[p1;
2
3
]; [q1;
2
3
]
???13  p1; q1o.10
4.1 Equilibria in a disturbed game
Consider the disturbed game  () obtained by attaching disturbances r
and t to the payos associated to the pure strategies U and L respectively.
The realization of the disturbances is private information. The domains Pr
and Pt, in which the probability distributions of the ambiguous variables r
and t lie, are common knowledge. Let their basic densities f br and f
b
t be the
uniform densities on [ 1; 1]:
Pr :=

f 2 F
???1  kr
2
 f(x)  1 + kr
2
for all x 2 [ 1; 1]

;
Pt :=

f 2 F
???1  kt
2
 f(x)  1 + kt
2
for all x 2 [ 1; 1]

:
We compute equilibrium strategies in the disturbed game, as a function of
the ambiguity parameters kr and kt. As shown in Lemma 3, the strategy
picked by player 2 will appear to player 1 as an Ellsberg strategy [qmin; qmax].
By Lemma 4, her best reply to [qmin; qmax] is a maxmin strategy characterized
by two thresholds r1 and r2. These two thresholds are illustrated in Figure
5. As shown in Lemma 9, for suciently small , a unique threshold value
lies in the support of r. This threshold r is the one associated with qmax,
because q = 2
3
is the upper bound of the equilibrium Ellsberg strategy of
player 2. The best reply to [qmin; qmax] is a pure strategy whose threshold r

is obtained in equation (27). For player 2, the best reply to [pmin; pmax] is a
pure strategy whose threshold t is obtained in equation (28).
r = U1(0; qmax)  U1(1; qmax) = 3qmax   2; (27)
t = U2(0; pmax)  U2(1; pmax) = 3pmax   2: (28)
Thresholds r and t completely characterize the equilibrium strategies of the
players for small disturbances. Our objective is therefore to compute their
values as a function of the parameters of the game.
10Our game  3 belongs to the set of games Riedel and Sass (2013) cover if one inverses
the two columns. Therefore,  3 is such that p  p and (1  q)  (1  q).
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r2 = r

p
0 1
U1
b
b
bb
pp
r1
U1(p; qmin)
U1(p; qmax)
Figure 5: Thresholds value r1 and r2 for a given Ellsberg strategy [qmin; qmax].
By simplifying equation (14) in Lemma 5, we have:11
qmax = max
f2Pt
Z t
 1
1
3
f(t)dt+
Z 1
t
1f(t)dt
=

1  (1  t)1 + kt
2

1
3
+ (1  t)1 + kt
2
1
=
1
3
 
2  t(1 + kt) + kt

Similarly, we obtain for pmax:
pmax = max
f2Pr
Z r
 1
1
3
f(r)dr +
Z 1
r
1f(r)dr =
1
3
 
2  r(1 + kr) + kr

Replacing in equations (27) and (28), the values of qmax and pmax found
above, we obtain a system of two equations:
r = kt   t(1 + kt);
t = kr   r(1 + kr):
Solving this system yields:(
r = kt kr(1+kt)
2 (1+kr)(1+kt) ;
t = kr kt(1+kr)
2 (1+kt)(1+kr) :
This last system of equations characterizes for small  the equilibrium strate-
gies in the disturbed game, as a function of the size of the disturbance  and
11The second expression is valid when t has a positive value, which is veried for small
 by equation (30).
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the ambiguity parameters kr and kt. When the disturbance  tends to 0, we
have:
lim
!0
r =
kr
1 + kr
; (29)
lim
!0
t =
kt
1 + kt
: (30)
4.2 The sequence of equilibria
The equilibrium strategy of player 2, characterized by t, is perceived by
player 1 as an Ellsberg strategy [qmin; qmax]. Alternatively, player 2 per-
ceives the strategy of player 1 characterized by r as an Ellsberg strategy
[pmin; pmax]. We computed above that:
qmax =
1
3
 
2  t(1 + kt) + kt

; (31)
pmax =
1
3
 
2  r(1 + kr) + kr

: (32)
Similarly, we derive:
qmin =
1
3
 
2  t(1  kt)  kt

; (33)
pmin =
1
3
 
2  r(1  kr)  kr

: (34)
Replacing in equations (31) to (34) variables t and r by their values allows
to compute the sequence fe()g of induced Ellsberg strategy proles in the
disturbed game  (). Theorem 1 proved that for all proper equilibria e of
 , we can nd a pair (kr; kt) 2 [0; 1]  [0; 1] such that lim!0fe()g = e.
Replacing r and t by their value in the limit, we obtain:
lim
!0
 
[pmin; pmax]; [qmin; qmax]

=
 
2
3
1
1 + kr
;
2
3

;

2
3
1
1 + kt
;
2
3
!
(35)
Remember that all proper Ellsberg equilibrium of this game are of the form
e =
 
[p1;
2
3
]; [q1;
2
3
]

with 1
3
 p1; q1. For kr = 0, we have pmin = 23 and for
kr = 1, we have pmin =
1
3
. Since function pmin is strictly monotone in kr
between these two bounds, and since the same is true for function qmin and
kt, any Ellsberg equilibrium in  3 can be disambiguated for a unique pair
(kr; kt).
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5 Concluding Remarks
Riedel and Sass (2013) have introduced Ellsberg games and proposed a so-
lution concept that they call Ellsberg equilibrium. It is a coarsening of Nash
equilibrium. Any Nash equilibrium is an Ellsberg equilibrium but the con-
verse does not hold: (quasi-) proper Ellsberg equilibria are not Nash equi-
libria. For the class of 22 normal form games that we consider, Harsanyi
(1973) has shown that all Nash equilibria in mixed strategies can be puri-
ed. Our Disambiguation Theorem shows that all (quasi-) proper Ellsberg
equilibria can be disambiguated. Moreover, for games of class I, all (quasi-)
proper Ellsberg equilibria can be puried. In that sense, our result extends
that of Harsanyi.
Generalizing our theorem beyond 22 normal games can unfortunately
not be done using the mathematical technique of Harsanyi. In eect, ambi-
guity averse players perform non-smooth evaluations of ambiguous outcomes.
We can nevertheless see no fundamental reason why this generalization could
not be performed, even though some challenging obstacles need to be over-
come.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. A proof of claim 1 can be found in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). We
prove claim 2: if player 1's payos are not Column Dominant in game   then
p 2 (0; 1) and U1(p; q) = U1(p; q0) for all q; q0 2 [0; 1].
Geometrically, given the strategy q chosen by player 2, the expected utility
U q1 (p) := U1(p; q) denes a line in [0; 1]  R. If we allow the domain of q to
be R, this line is dened in R2. The family of such lines fU q1 (p)gq2[0;1] has
the property of Unique Intersection.
Property 1 (Unique Intersection).
Let fU q1 (p)gq2[0;1] be a family of lines dened in R2. The family has the
property of unique intersection if there exists a point (~p; u1) 2 R2 at which
all members of the family intersect.
This unique intersection (~p; u1) is hence such that for all q 2 [0; 1], the
point (~p; u1) 2 U q1 (p).
We show now that family fU q1 (p)gq2[0;1] has a unique intersection (~p; u1).
Player 1's expected utility can be rewritten:
U1(p; q) = 
4
1 + q
 
(31   41) + p(11   21   31 + 41)

+ p(21   41):
The value ~p at which an intersection takes place is therefore the solution of
the following equation:
(31   41) + ~p(11   21   31 + 41) = 0:
As there are no weakly dominant strategies in  , player 1's payo are not
Row Dominant and hence two cases can arise.
• Case A: 11 > 31 and 21 < 41.
The solution ~p of last equation belongs to (0; 1) if either 11 > 
2
1 and
31 < 
4
1 or 
1
1 < 
2
1 and 
3
1 > 
4
1. This means ~p 2 (0; 1) if player 1's
payo are not Column Dominant. Therefore the factor 11 21 31+41
is dierent from zero. As a result the solution ~p is unique.
• Case B: 11 < 31 and 21 > 41
A parallel argument can be made to show ~p 2 (0; 1) and is unique.
We now prove for games with ~p 2 (0; 1) that this intersection is the
maxmin strategy, that is ~p = p. By denition of indierence strategy q, we
have for all p 2 [0; 1] that U1(p; q) = U1(~p; q) = u1 and hence U q1 (p) is at:
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U1(0; q
)   U1(1; q) = 0. As player 1 has no weakly dominant strategy, the
dierence U1(0; q)  U1(1; q) is strictly monotone in q. This implies q is the
only value for which U q1 (p) is at. We showed that q
 2 (0; 1), implying there
exist hence q0 and q00 in [0; 1] such that q0 < q < q00. By strict monotonicity of
the dierence U1(0; q) U1(1; q), we have that among the two lines U q01 (p) and
U q
00
1 (p), one is strictly increasing and the other strictly decreasing. Therefore,
as ~p 2 (0; 1), for any p 2 [0; 1] with p 6= ~p there exists q 2 [0; 1] with q 6= q
such that U q1 (p) < U
q
1 (~p). The maxmin strategy p is hence at the intersection
~p. This completes the proof as we showed that utility in ~p is independent of
q. The proof of claim 3 is done using the same argument.

A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. We assume without loss of generality that p1 < p2. First, we show
q 2 fq1; q2g. As shown in Lemma 1, for all   2  , we have that q 2 (0; 1)
and is unique. The Ellsberg strategy [p1; p2] is a best reply to [q1; q2], if
and only if we have for all p 2 [p1; p2] there exists no p0 2 [0; 1] such that
U1
 
p0; [q1; q2]

> U1
 
p; [q1; q2]

. Being ambiguity averse, player 1 must be
indierent between all mixed strategies inside the Ellsberg strategy [p1; p2]
she plays. Formally, for all p; p0 2 [p1; p2] we have
U1
 
p0; [q1; q2]

= U1
 
p; [q1; q2]

:
As U1
 
p; [q1; q2]

= min
 
U1(p; q1); U1(p; q2)

(equation (1)), we must have
either
• U1(p; q1) is constant (implying q1 = q) and U1(p; q1)  U1(p; q2) for all
p 2 [p1; p2], or
• U1(p; q2) is constant (implying q2 = q) and U1(p; q2)  U1(p; q1) for all
p 2 [p1; p2].
Therefore we have q 2 fq1; q2g.
Second, we show p 2 fp1; p2g. If [q1; q2] is a proper Ellsberg strategy, then
the reasoning above proves it. We show it holds as well if the equilibrium is
quasi-proper, that is q1 = q2. From the previous reasoning, this implies q1 =
q2 = q
. The Ellsberg strategy q is a best reply to [p1; p2], if and only if there
exists no q0 2 [0; 1] such that U2
 
q0; [p1; p2]

> U2
 
q; [p1; p2]

. Remember we
have U2
 
q; [p1; p2]

= min
 
U2(q; p1); U2(q; p2)

. Function U2(q; p) is linear in
q. We show that if p =2 fp1; p2g, we have a contradiction.
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• If U2(q; [p1; p2]) is strictly increasing in q on [0; 1], then best reply is
q1 = q2 = 1, and since q
 6= 1 for all   2  , we have a contradiction.
• If U2(q; [p1; p2]) is strictly decreasing in q on [0; 1], then best reply is
q1 = q2 = 0, and since q
 6= 0, we have another contradiction.
• If U2(q; [p1; p2]) is strictly increasing in q on one portion of [0; 1] and
stricly decreasing on the other, then the best reply is q. In eect, by
the property of Unique Intersection, U2(q; p1) and U2(q; p2) must then
intersect in (q; u2) and U2(q; [p1; p2]) has maximal value for q = q. As
for all   2  , q 6= q, we have yet another contradiction.
The only possibility for q to belong to best replies is that either U2(q; p1) or
U2(q; p2) is constant in q, which implies p
 2 fp1; p2g. 
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. We show that for all p 2 [pmin; pmax], there exists a density f 2 Pr
such that
p =
Z 1
 1
pb(r)f(r)dr:
The domain Pr is convex. This means that for all f1; f2 2 Pr, distribution
f3 dened as f3(r) := f1(r) + (1   )f2(r) belongs to Pr. The mappingR 1
 1 p
b(r)f(r)dr is linear in f . As the image of a convex set through a linear
mapping is a convex set, the image of Pr through this mapping is convex.
In the real line, a convex set is an interval. As Pr is closed, so must be its
image

pmin; pmax

. 
A.4 Best replies in disturbed game
For all   2   such that player 1's payos are Column Dominant, the following
lemma provides conditions under which a pure strategy of player 1 is a best
reply to a strategy of player 2 inducing [qmin; qmax].
12
Lemma 13 (Best-Reply in pure strategy).
For all  > 0 and all   2   such that player 1's payos are Column Domi-
nant, the strategy pb is a best reply to any [qmin; qmax]  [0; 1] if it is a pure
12In Lemma 13, the conditions under which the expression max(r0; r00) is used for r are
such that the solution p of the implicit equation U1(p; 0) = U1(p; 1) is non-positive. The
conditions under which the expression min(r0; r00) is used for r are such that the solution
p of the implicit equation U1(p; 0) = U1(p; 1) is equal or larger than 1.
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strategy pb = r 2 S1pu dened by:
r0 = U1(0; qmin)  U1(1; qmin);
r00 = U1(0; qmax)  U1(1; qmax);
r =

max(r0; r00) if j31   41j  j11   21j;
min(r0; r00) otherwise.
Proof. The proof is only provided for the conditions on player 1's payos
leading to r = max(r0; r00). Those conditions ensure that the solution to
equation (31   41) + p(11   21   31 + 41) = 0, which yields the unique
intersection ~p, is non-positive. Therefore the relevant threshold among r0
and r00 is the largest one.13
Take any  > 0, any [qmin; qmax]  [0; 1] and any   2   such that
• player 1's payos are Column Dominant, and
• the solution to equation (31   41) + p(11   21   31 + 41) = 0 is non-
positive.
Given equations (1) and (2), we have
U1
 
p; [qmin; qmax]; r

= min
 
U1(p; qmin; r); U1(p; qmax; r)

= min
 
U1(p; qmin) + pr; U1(p; qmax) + pr

where U1(p; q; r) is linear in p since U1(p; q) is linear in p. For the considered
 , p is not a proper mixed strategy and the unique intersection of U1(p; q1)
and U1(p; q2) is in (~p; u1) with ~p  0. Therefore, if qmin 6= qmax, we have two
possible cases:
• Case A: U1(p; qmin) > U1(p; qmax) for all p 2 (0; 1),
• Case B: U1(p; qmin) < U1(p; qmax) for all p 2 (0; 1).
Let q^ := qmax if we are in case A and q^ := qmin if we are in case B. The mixed
strategy q^ 2 fqmin; qmaxg is the one associated with the minimal utility for
player 1, the one she takes into account in front of ambiguity. We have hence
U1
 
p; [qmin; qmax]; r

= U1(p; q^) + pr:
13If qmin = qmax then r
 = r0 = r00. But if qmin < qmax, two cases can arise: either
U1(p; qmin) < U1(p; qmax) for all p 2 (0; 1] or U1(p; qmin) > U1(p; qmax) for all p 2 (0; 1].
Assume that the game   is such that the rst of these two cases arises. The relevant
threshold r is therefore r0 associated to qmin. Under the payo conditions leading to
r = max(r0; r00), U1(p; qmin) and U1(p; qmax) are two straight lines which cross at ~p  0.
As a result, we have U1(0; qmin) U1(1; qmin) > U1(0; qmax) U1(1; qmax). The other case
leads to the same conclusion.
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From the denition of q^ and the denition of r in the statement of the lemma,
we have r = U1(0; q^)   U1(1; q^), which can be rewritten U1(0; q^) + 0r =
U1(1; q^) + 1r
 implying that:
1. U1(0; q^) + 0r > U1(1; q^) + 1r for all r < r
,
2. U1(0; q^) + 0r < U1(1; q^) + 1r for all r > r
.
As U1(p; q^)+ pr is a linear function of p, the best reply to all r < r
 is p = 0
and the best reply to all r > r is p = 1. If r = r then U1(p; q^) + pr is a
constant and any p 2 [0; 1] is a best reply, and in particular p = 0. 
For all   2   such that player 2's payos are Row Dominant, there exists
similar conditions under which a pure strategy of player 2 is a best reply to
a strategy of player 1 inducing [pmin; pmax].
14
14For for all   2   such that player 2's payos are Row Dominant, those conditions are
obtained for pure strategies of player 2 by replacing 11 by 
1
2 , 
4
1 by 
4
2 , 
2
1 by 
3
2 and 
3
1
by 22 .
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